Professor Khadiyatoulah Fall, who introduced the concept of the "post-halal era" at the World Halal Summit in Istanbul in November 2025, analyzes the Halal Day of December 23, 2025, held as part of the 33rd FIDAK in Senegal. He outlines some prerequisites for the success of a halal economy in Senegal.

A Halal Day was held at CICES on December 23, 2025 as part of the 33rd FIDAK (December 7–31, 2025) .

It was led by ADEPME (with Appsaya ) and structured around an explicitly economic framework: "The halal economy, a lever for growth for our SMEs"

The most salient elements (as implicit and explicit “propositions”) are as follows:

• “Normative” and “market” framework : priority placed on standards and certification , conceived as conditions for accessing markets.

• Export orientation and value chains : halal is presented as a lever for moving upmarket , structuring value chains, and diversifying exports (beyond the domestic market alone).

• Concrete “marketing” mechanism : “Halal Market” type exhibition + B2B networking (buyers/distributors/investors), with the idea of leading to memoranda of understanding and partnerships .

• Internationalization through diplomatic presence and benchmarking : announced participation of actors/representatives (notably Malaysia and Indonesia ), which signals a strategy of “connecting” to already consolidated halal ecosystems.

• Sectoral expansion : discourse insisting that halal is not limited to agri-food, but also covers Islamic finance , modest fashion , tourism , cosmetics , etc.

These markers converge towards the same idea: to shift halal from a register of “religious consumption” to a register of “standard of quality, traceability and market access” .

2) Critical reading: realism, potential, feasibility

A. What is realistic and promising

1. The shift of the debate towards standards is good news: it is the minimum condition to avoid remaining in the incantation (“halal = 2 billion consumers”), and to talk about competitiveness, compliance, quality assurance, traceability .

2. The B2B staging (buyers/distributors/investors) is a signal of maturity: it suggests that one wants to test outlets and not just hold a forum.

3. Sectoral expansion is strategically sound, provided it is sequenced: finance, tourism, cosmetics, modest fashion fall under different normative chains, but the idea of a “halal ecosystem” is coherent if one accepts a deployment in waves.

B. The point of vigilance: the risk of “skipping the institutional step”

Feasibility does not depend primarily on rhetoric, but on an architecture of trust . However, halal is a market with high fixed costs : audits, compliance, documentation, laboratories, traceability, logistics, input control, training, etc.

If this infrastructure is not installed, Senegal risks:

• either to produce a “domestic” halal product not recognized for export,

• either to depend on costly external certification, reducing the value captured locally,

• or to open up a space of confusion (proliferation of labels, conflicts of legitimacy, suspicions of rent-seeking).

The Day of December 23rd has the merit of identifying these issues (standards/certification), but the decisive question becomes: who arbitrates, who accredits, who controls, and according to what doctrine of international recognition?

3) Feasibility conditions: “setting the record straight” without shattering optimism

Condition 1 — Clarify the Senegalese doctrine of halal (religious, economic, sovereign)

Senegal has a unique characteristic: a socially dominant Islam, historically Sufi, with a strong cohesive function , and a state that must preserve the balance between economy, pluralism and stability.

Consequently, two symmetrical pitfalls must be avoided:

• hyper-religiification (which transforms halal into a conflictual identity marker),

• naive de-religiosisation (which denies that, for part of the public, halal trust also rests on credible religious authorities).

The realistic approach is to define a division of roles :

• the State and its agencies: quality, trade, export, traceability, standardisation ;

• recognized religious institutions: ethical framework and social legitimation , without monopolistic capture;

• the private sector: investments, upgrading, innovation .

Condition 2 — Certification governance: reduce fragmentation, increase recognition

The goal is not to "have a label," but to be recognized . Therefore, it is necessary to:

• a national reference authority (or an accreditation mechanism) capable of organizing the ecosystem of certifiers;

• auditable procedures , public reference frameworks, documentary traceability;

• a strategy of mutual recognition with target areas (MENA, Asia, Europe), avoiding the simple copy-paste of a foreign model.

Condition 3 — A “SME-compatible” strategy

The argument that “halal = global standards” is correct, but it can be socially counterproductive if compliance costs exclude SMEs. Hence, three imperatives:

• an upgrade program (hygiene, HACCP/ISO depending on sectors, traceability, packaging, export documentation);

• a co-financing scheme for certification/audit for the most promising SMEs;

• end-to-end support (production → control → logistics → distribution).

This is precisely where ADEPME is relevant , if it positions itself as an architect of compliance pathways and not just as an organizer of events.

Condition 4 — Logistics and proof: Halal is exported with proof, not with intentions

For export, halal is inseparable from:

• the cold chain , consistent quality, document management,

• the ability to respond to audits,

• logistical reliability (deadlines, volumes, regularity).

Without this, enthusiasm turns into disappointment. The realistic approach here is to start with pilot programs where Senegal has an advantage and where proof can be built.

4) Benefit from international “confluence” without losing sight of the Senegalese context

Through its contacts, particularly under the initiative of Halal Senegal, a plurality of models (Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan, Europe, Morocco, Dubai, Saudi Arabia) are presented. The correct approach is not to “choose the best country,” but to analyze what each model offers and adapt it to the Senegalese context.

• Malaysia / Indonesia : strength in the ecosystem (standardization, accreditation schemes, state-market relationship). Useful for building the institutional “backbone”.

• Turkey : ability to make halal a subject of trade fairs, exhibitions, and industry , linked to economic diplomacy (platforms, trade shows, exports). Useful for the “B2B + supply chain” logic.

• Europe : focus on compliance, traceability, reputational risks , and the coexistence of market demands and public controversies. Useful for anticipating debates and avoiding polarization.

• Gulf / Saudi Arabia / Dubai : purchasing power, logistics hubs, but high requirements: useful as target markets, provided that the immediate absorption capacity of SMEs is not overestimated.

• Maghreb model (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) : Senegal is in a situation where the challenge is not simply to “produce halal,” but to do so without destabilizing the moral economy of a predominantly Sufi , socially pacifying, and historically structuring Islam. The Maghreb model provides three useful safeguards: secularization without desacralization : halal is treated as a standard of compliance (hygiene, traceability, audits), but religious legitimacy is institutionalized (opinions, supervision, committees), which avoids anarchic competition among authorities; preventing the proliferation of labels : a national brand/label clarifies “who is authoritative,” reduces controversies, and makes trust exportable; making the SME strategy compatible : the standardization system allows for the development of gradual upgrade pathways, instead of demanding unattainable standards from the outset.

Conclusion: For Senegal, realistic optimism means saying:

• Yes, international convergence is an opportunity.

• But success depends first and foremost on a national doctrine of trust : an exportable Senegalese halal , which is based on a legible normative authority , a framed religious legitimation , and auditable evidence .

And this is precisely where the Maghreb model is invaluable: it shows how to transform a shared religious sensibility into an infrastructure of trust , without opening up a field of symbolic rivalries or a market of competing labels. The Senegalese approach must remain threefold: 1) Senegalese Islam (Sufi, social, stabilizing) : halal must be presented as an economy of quality and trust , not as a boundary of identity; with 2) a vision of development : halal only makes sense if it creates value locally (employment, processing, formalization, net exports) but not if it becomes a source of label revenue; 3) anchored in a gradual approach : start with demonstration projects, produce verifiable results, then expand.

Mr. Khadiyatoulah Fall, Professor Emeritus, UQAC, Quebec, Canada