Since the discovery of the hidden debt left by Macky Sall's regime, Senegal has been caught in a vice between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and major Western rating agencies. This has resulted in the suspension of IMF disbursements and the downgrading of the country's sovereign credit rating. To loosen this grip, some "experts" claim that the regime has no choice but to sign an agreement with the IMF, which is demanding the restructuring of the country's external debt.

Negotiating with the IMF: at what price?

But it's not just the "experts" who think this way. Some members of the government believe it too. This is notably the case of the Minister of Finance and Budget, Mr. Cheikh Diba, who emphasized this in Le Soleil on June 30, 2025. (page 5) that " The most important thing is to normalize our relations with the IMF ." And he adds, There are principles regarding financial and budgetary governance, and the Fund ensures that these principles are not violated by states…There is very serious, very difficult, and very rigorous work being done with the International Monetary Fund.”

This statement raises several questions. What purpose have these "principles" served in the past? Is Mr. Diba implying that these "principles" were not properly applied by Macky Sall's regime, given its disastrous management of public finances? And why would the current government need the IMF to implement the principles of "good governance" in financial and budgetary matters?

On August 27, 2025, at the end of its visit, the IMF mission issued a statement proposing to negotiate an "ambitious reform program " with Senegal. Does this mean that past programs were not "ambitious"? Apparently, this proposal did not impress the Senegalese government, which continues to refuse an agreement with the IMF that would jeopardize its economic and social recovery agenda unveiled in August 2025.

The results of IMF interventions in Senegal

Whether "ambitious" or not, IMF programs have consistently plunged the country into crisis and reinforced its external dependence. It is worth recalling that the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), imposed on Senegal in the early 1980s by the IMF and the World Bank, effectively dismantled most of the gains achieved by the country during the first two decades of independence. Senegal, it was said, was among the "best students" in implementing the policies dictated by these two institutions. After 20 years in their "class," it would eventually join the group of "least developed countries" (LDCs), that is, the "poorest" countries, according to the United Nations.

After the destruction wrought by structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the era of "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers" (PRSPs) began. With these documents, the World Bank and the IMF substituted "the fight against poverty" for development. And African governments were once again swept along on this neoliberal train, which led them into a dead end. For the more there was talk of "poverty reduction," the more poverty spread and worsened.

It was in this context that the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) was introduced in 2005. This is an economic program dictated by the IMF to a country, with or without financing. Once approved, this program signals to donors and financial markets the "credibility" of the country's economic policies. Senegal was one of the first "Francophone" countries to sign a PSI with the IMF.

As part of the "Emerging Senegal Plan" (PSE), Senegal signed an ISPE (Inter-State Partnership Agreement) in June 2015. This agreement served as a reference point in relations between the regime and its "partners" for almost the entire duration of Macky Sall's first term. But clearly, neither the ISPE nor the other agreements signed with the IMF contributed to the country's "emergence."

However, those who favor collaboration with the IMF find these agreements useful because they allow access to financing either from the IMF itself or from other donors. But this financing is a respite, sometimes temporary, that reinforces the IMF's control, before the next crisis and the negotiation of a new program! This creates a vicious cycle that allows the IMF and creditors to control Senegal's economic policies and plunge the country further into debt. One then wonders why those urging the government to sign with the IMF don't question the record of the institution's 45 years of intervention.

To reassure the markets or the Senegalese population?

In their view, an agreement with the IMF is necessary to "reassure the markets" and technical and financial "partners" so that Senegal can borrow again. This is the language of people programmed to parrot the accepted neoliberal discourse. Here again, one wonders if the "experts" question the results of such policies. For decades, Senegal has constantly "reassured" lenders, both public and private. But to what end? Increasingly unsustainable external debt, but also the reinforcement of an extroverted growth model based on raw material exports. It was precisely by trying to "reassure" the financial markets to preserve "the quality of its credit rating" that Macky Sall's regime embarked on a path that generated hidden debt, with the complicity of the IMF!

Debt restructuring, as advocated by the IMF and "experts," is a long and complex process that is costly for the indebted country. Ethiopia provides an example. According to Financial Afrik , it took five years of arduous and difficult negotiations to reach the first agreement between Ethiopia and France, one of its bilateral creditors within the framework of the G20 Common Negotiating Framework. This example confirms the observation of the Ndiaye-Kessler Report that " The debt restructuring system has proven inefficient and complex, resulting in lengthy processes that largely exclude countries from international credit." (p. 5)

Especially since a genuine restructuring in Senegal's case should involve private creditors, given that private debt represents an estimated 40% of the country's external debt. However, the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative, launched to combat the effects of Covid-19, was a failure, partly due to the refusal of private creditors to participate. In fact, they only contributed 0.2%, according to the UK-based NGO Debt Justice. Senegal, which had high hopes for this Initiative, will receive only a pittance. Indeed, in the press release published on June 11, 2020 by the Ministry of Finance and Budget, we read: “ Senegal’s participation in the Debt Service Suspension Initiative [DSSI] will materialize by the suspension of the payment of principal and interest due to all creditors in the official bilateral sector until December 31, 2020 for an amount of 90.5 billion CFA francs (137 million euros) between June 1, 2020 and the end of the year, i.e. 13.51% of the external debt service due in 2020 ”.

The examples of Senegal and Ethiopia show that, in reality, the "solutions" proposed by creditors, through restructuring or any other means, never meet the demands of indebted countries, which risk becoming even more dependent on and under the control of their creditors. In the current context of Senegal, restructuring would run counter to the new government's desire to escape the oversight of the IMF and private creditors. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the government's refusal to accept this solution. The current regime was elected to pursue policies different from those of the previous regime. Consequently, it must avoid following the same path and strive to implement policies designed to reassure the Senegalese people rather than the financial markets.

It is in this context that we should consider the Economic and Social Recovery Plan (PRES) presented at the beginning of August 2025 by Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko. According to him , "the objective of the recovery phase of Vision 2050 is to definitively shift gears from an old model to a new one, a prerequisite for impetus and acceleration. " However, the IMF is one of the pillars of this "old model," which is bankrupt and discredited!

Conclusion

The impasse in discussions between the IMF and the Senegalese government suggests that the latter is seeking to free itself from dependence on external creditors. This explains its refusal to yield to pressure from "partners" and "experts" who urge it to "reassure the markets" by accepting the IMF's neoliberal prescriptions.

By refusing to restructure the country's external debt, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko aims to avoid the trap the IMF and other creditors are trying to set for Senegal. This would contradict the financing strategy of the Economic and Social Recovery Plan, which is based on mobilizing domestic resources. Indeed, Mr. Sonko has stated repeatedly that Senegal's development will not come from the IMF or other "partners." Domestic resources are the primary source of financing for the country's development. This is the path that must be pursued. It is a difficult path, certainly, but it is the path of sovereignty, which involves costs and even sacrifices.  

Demba Moussa Dembélé