The French political scene has been undergoing unprecedented upheaval for several months. Re-elected in 2022 but deprived of a stable majority in the National Assembly in 2024, the head of state finds himself facing a major institutional crisis. Between political deadlock, the threat of dissolution, social tensions, and economic uncertainties, France, long perceived as a democratic showcase and a proven institutional model, now seems to be collapsing under the weight of its own imbalances.

This political upheaval, beyond its internal repercussions, raises questions well beyond France's borders. For France is not only a central player in Europe: it also remains, relatively speaking, a historical, institutional, and symbolic reference point for a large part of French-speaking Africa. The political malaise it is experiencing thus acts as a revealing mirror of shared fragilities and the limits of a model often reproduced without sufficient adaptation to local realities.

So, what lessons can African countries draw from this to rethink the solidity of their institutions, the political responsibility of their leaders and the vitality of their democracy?

I. The French Mirror: Lessons and Vulnerabilities of Francophone African Constitutions

The constitutions of many French-speaking African countries—Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, to name just a few—are largely inspired by the French Constitution of 1958. They share the same architecture: a powerful president, a government appointed by the executive, and a parliament often limited to a role of validation rather than effective oversight.

However, unlike in France, where civil society, the press, and certain institutions play a counterbalancing role, this balance often remains theoretical in Africa. The concentration of executive power, the weakness of political parties, the absence of a strong parliamentary culture, and the fragility of the independence of judicial institutions make our democracies particularly vulnerable to the personalization of power.

This vulnerability translates into recurring tensions surrounding presidential mandates, opportunistic constitutional revisions, and periodic political crises. The situation in France, marked by a president facing a fragmented parliament, reminds us that even a supposedly stable model can falter. For Francophone Africa, this is a warning: copying a constitutional model is not enough; it is also necessary to invest in institutional counterbalances, an active civil society, and a robust political culture to prevent authoritarian drift and ensure democratic stability.

II. The case of Senegal: a model under observation

Senegal, long considered a democratic exception in West Africa, remains a closely observed political laboratory in the subregion. Its constitutional history, punctuated by successive adjustments and reforms, reflects a constant search for balance between the effectiveness of executive power and respect for democratic principles. Recent debates surrounding the role of the President and the Prime Minister illustrate this dynamic well.

Under Macky Sall, the abolition and subsequent restoration of the post of Prime Minister highlighted the tensions inherent in a semi-presidential regime inherited from the French model. The abolition in 2019 was intended to “streamline government action,” but it also reinforced the concentration of power in the hands of the head of state.

The return of the post of Prime Minister in 2022, confirmed and consolidated under the tandem Bassirou Diomaye Faye – Ousmane Sonko, marks a significant rebalancing of executive power.

The recent government reshuffle gives the Prime Minister greater autonomy in conducting national policy, coordinating government action, and engaging in dialogue with social forces. This development, if it continues in practice, could mitigate the personalization of power, long perceived as a structural feature of the Senegalese political system.

However, this strengthening of the Prime Minister's role does not eliminate the challenges: it presupposes harmonious political cohabitation between two figures of strong legitimacy—the President and the head of government—as well as a lasting clarification of the areas of responsibility. Senegal's political history shows that institutional balance remains fragile if it is not based on a shared political culture of mutual respect for competences.

In this respect, Senegal offers a textbook case: an experimental democracy, in search of institutional maturity, where the texts evolve at the pace of political society. The new ruling duo perhaps embodies the beginnings of a more collegial African model, less presidentialist, and potentially more resilient in the face of crises of authority.

III. Lessons and lessons of anticipation for French-speaking Africa

The institutional crisis France is currently experiencing highlights the fragility of the balance between executive and legislative powers in semi-presidential regimes. This situation should serve as a warning and a source of reflection for African leaders, jurists, and constitutionalists. It shows that no democracy, however ancient, is immune to political deadlock when institutions lack clarity, solidity, or adaptability. Three major lessons emerge for French-speaking Africa:

Clarify political responsibility and institutional coherence:

One of the most obvious lessons is the need to better articulate the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches. A president elected by direct universal suffrage but lacking a parliamentary majority finds himself in a situation of political powerlessness: he retains the prestige of power without having the means to act. This is the paradox of the "armless monarch." To avoid this imbalance, African constitutions must provide clear mechanisms for cohabitation, power-sharing, or measured parliamentary dissolution, in order to ensure effective governability without authoritarian drift.

Strengthening the credibility and solidity of control institutions

The case of Senegal, often cited as a model of stability, reminds us that the solidity of a democracy does not rest solely on the formal existence of institutions, but on the trust they inspire. The Senegalese Constitutional Council, for example, plays a central role, but its legitimacy depends on the sense of impartiality it inspires. In France, the current crisis has not escalated, because the strength of institutions lies in their historical roots and the trust of the people. African states must also invest in this institutional legitimacy, through transparent appointments, a culture of checks and balances, and the protection of the independence of constitutional bodies.

Establish a true culture of political anticipation: African crises often arise from improvisation: abrupt dissolutions, opportunistic constitutional revisions, or poorly prepared successions. This lack of preparation weakens the state and fuels instability. It is urgent to enshrine in fundamental texts specific mechanisms for managing situations of deadlock or power vacuum: regulated transition procedures, conditions for the removal of the head of state, or even modalities for cohabitation in the event of an opposing parliamentary majority. Indeed, anticipation means preventing a crisis before it turns into an institutional breakdown.

IV. From imitation to invention: towards an authentic African model of governance

The French political crisis, far from being a simple European episode, offers French-speaking Africa an unprecedented opportunity to question the relevance of its own institutions. For decades, our constitutions have been designed as replicas of Western models, translated into our contexts without integrating their sociopolitical and cultural foundations. This institutional mimicry has produced texts that are legally respectable, but often disconnected from the realities experienced by our peoples. It is time to move from a logic of imitation to an approach of invention, by building institutions rooted in our democratic practices, our political cultures, and our development needs. Concretely, this transformation involves:

More established and participatory territorial governance: the future of African democracy depends on strengthening local power. Local authorities must cease to be mere relays of the central government and become genuine actors in public decision-making. Increasing their financial, administrative, and political autonomy brings governance closer to the citizen and allows for better consideration of local specificities. A democracy that is only experienced in the capital remains fragile; a democracy that takes root in the territories becomes sustainable.

truly limited and non-negotiable presidential terms: presidential term limits are often proclaimed but rarely respected. They should no longer be seen as a constraint, but as a guarantee of political vitality and democratic renewal. Limitation clauses should be locked in such a way as to make any opportunistic revision impossible. Africa does not lack leaders; it lacks peaceful transitions. The credibility of our states will depend on the ability of our leaders to submit to the rule rather than circumvent it.

Independent constitutional institutions open to society: democratic consolidation requires constitutional courts and higher judicial councils free from any political influence. Their legitimacy will not only come from their founding text, but from the transparency of their appointments, the diversity of their members and their ability to render reasoned and publicly accessible decisions. Openness to civil society, the academic world and professional legal bodies would allow these institutions to be anchored in public trust, an essential condition of their moral authority.

a parliament that fully assumes its rightful role: a strong parliament is not measured by the solemnity of its sessions, but by the effectiveness of its oversight of government action. Members of parliament and senators must once again become the true voices of the people, not extensions of the executive branch. This requires better oversight of party funding, ongoing training for elected officials, and increased transparency in legislative procedures. A democracy without effective countervailing power is doomed to presidential decline.

In short, it is a matter for Francophone Africa to fully assume its constitutional autonomy: moving from the copied Constitution to the lived Constitution. It is by reinventing our institutions based on our own historical experience, our community values and our vision of development that we will be able to give concrete content to the political sovereignty so proclaimed since independence.

François Mame Samba NDIAYE, Lawyer, Consultant, Expert in mediation, arbitration and conciliation