Bernard Tine, expert en com : "Sous couvert de culture : l’influence croissante des Maisons russes au Sénégal"
Long considered one of the most stable and institutionally sound countries in West Africa, Senegal occupies a special place in Russia's strategy of influence on the continent. A Francophone country, a historical ally of the West, with still-functional civil institutions and an active media landscape, Senegal represents a symbolic prize for Moscow: establishing a lasting influence there would demonstrate that Russian strategy is not limited to military regimes or fragile states.
It is within this context that the development of the Kalinka Russian cultural center in Dakar, commonly referred to as a Russian House, takes place. Officially dedicated to the promotion of Russian culture and language, this center, according to many observers, is in reality part of an ecosystem of political, activist, and media actors whose orientation extends far beyond the cultural sphere.
Unlike some Russian Houses in Africa that are directly derived from the Rossotrudnichestvo franchise model, the Kalinka Russian Cultural Center has a hybrid structure. It is officially headed by Larissa Kryukova, wife of the former Russian ambassador to Senegal, Sergei Kryukov. This diplomatic connection lends her strong institutional legitimacy, while also allowing her to benefit from an extensive local political and administrative network. In practice, however, a large part of the center's operational activity and public outreach is carried out by Oumy Sène, the deputy director. She embodies the true local linchpin of the Russian cultural presence in Dakar. Oumy Sène does not come from a cultural background. But she has a compelling Senegalese history. She is none other than the daughter of the late Ibrahima Sène, a historical figure in the Party for Independence and Labor (PIT). More than a cultural role, she represents the Kalinka Centre at international events, notably at the Russia-Africa Forum in St. Petersburg, and often speaks in Russian propaganda media (Russia Today, African Initiative).
It is also cited as an interface between soft power and Senegalese pan-Africanist movements. Kalinka, in addition to being a cultural center, is a point of political convergence. Senegal also hosts a branch of the KCOPC (Council of Russian Compatriots), an organization widely documented as an instrument of Russian influence abroad.
The Senegalese branch maintains close ties with the Kalinka Centre, local activist groups, and the PARADE International Senegal movement, chaired by the very active Samba Mbenda Diaw, an intellectual who frequently contributes to the local press and advocates a break with the West, pan-Africanism, and a strategic reorientation towards Russia.
Finally, there's Urgences Panafricanistes, a movement founded by Kémi Séba and regularly cited for its links to the Wagner ecosystem. He recently had his Beninese citizenship revoked following his support for the attempted coup against Patrice Talon. Under the pretext of denouncing "Western neocolonialism," he and his associate Nathalie Yamb are mobilizing activist groups around issues key to Moscow: the withdrawal of French military bases, etc.
The programming of the Kalinka center illustrates the transformation of the model of Russian Houses: political events under a cultural guise, the presence of geopolitical narratives in the content broadcast, and systematic relaying of activities by Russian media.
Culture becomes an operational pretext, allowing us to reach students, artists and intellectual circles, and young activists, particularly those from pan-Africanist movements.
Unlike in Mali or Burkina Faso, Russia does not operate in Senegal within a militarized environment or one openly hostile to the West. It favors an incremental and discreet approach, influencing existing activist networks and exploiting local debates on sovereignty. This strategy aims less at immediate rupture than at the gradual erosion of the consensus surrounding liberal democracy.
In Senegal, the Russian House does not present itself as a military recruitment center or a tool for brutal destabilization. Rather, it acts as a hub of political influence, linking official diplomacy, media propaganda, and local activism.
Commentaires (5)
Bernard Tine me rappelle Abdou Diouf quand il dirigeait la francophonie. Le problème des dirigeants et académiciens français était (et est toujours) l'anglicisme qui a pénétré la langue française et que les jeunes français aiment. Abdou Diouf se donna comme mission de parler aux jeunes français pour leur demander de préférer leur langue française à l'anglais. Dans un discours, il déclara: "l jeunesse française préfère l'utilisation de mots anglais à la place des équivalents français qu'elle trouve ringards. Mais être ringard, c'est préférer la langue d'un autre à la place de votre langue maternelle ". Attaquer l'anglais pour le français. Et celui qui le fait oublie qu'il est sérère. Comment avoir un cerveau aussi noyé au point de ne pas comprendre qu'on est exactement le prototype de ce qu'on reproche à l'autre d'être.
C'est exactement cette noyade du cerveau que vit Bernard Tine. Il crie de refuser la culture russe, de préférer la culture française, et il s'oublie. C'est dramatique.
NB: Une seule chose me manque dans ce texte l'adresse de la Maison Russe. Il m'aurait beaucoup aidé en la donnant. Mais, je trouverais. Et, inchallah, à cause de ce texte je participerais aux activités de cette maison.
Au Sénégal,la Russie avance masquée!
Les valeurs qu'elle véhicule ne sont cependant pas les nôtres!
Vigilance !
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